This paper studies the association between a country's level of nancial development and rms' employment growth. We employ an incomplete contract model for evaluating this association. The model proposes that a high level of nancial development aects the employment of rms with low managerial capital negatively, while rms with high managerial capital benet from a more developed nancial system. We test this proposition with data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey covering transition countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We use rm size as a proxy for managerial capital. Our ndings conrm a non-linear eect of nancial development on rm employment. Specically, the smallest rms respond to higher levels of nancial development with a reduction in employment, especially in countries at medium levels of nancial development.
Introduction
The recent global nancial crisis and the parallel job losses in many countries around the world have triggered broad interest in the link between nance and employment. This link is related to, but much less studied than the connections between nance and economic growth (e.g. King & Levine 1993a , King & Levine 1993b , Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 2004 , Levine 2005 , and Beck, Levine & Levkov 2010 . In this paper, we contribute to lling this gap. Specically, we address the following two questions: Do rms in countries with a higher level of nancial development experience higher employment growth than rms in countries with a lower level of nancial development? Are dierent rm types aected dierently?
We use a theoretical model of incomplete contracts that is closely related to Pagano & Pica (2011) .Their model explains employment responses at the industry level to a country's level ofnancial development. We adjust this model to individual rms and introduce managerial capital of rms, following Bruhn, Karlan & Schoar (2010) . We propose that the eect of nancial development on rms' employment depends on the rm's managerial capital: a high level of nancial development aects the employment of rms with low managerial capital negatively, while rms with high managerial capital benet from a more developed nancial system. This is because all rms have better access to nance with a higher level of nancial development and so want to expand their physical investment as well as employment. This increases the competitive pressure on the labour market. The resulting higher wages overcompensate the initial advantage from increased access to nance for rms with low managerial capital as they can no longer pay these high wages.
We test this proposition by using rm-level data from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which is conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. By controlling for the rm's age and economic sector, we use rm size as a proxy for managerial capital. This is in line with Lucas (1978) who proposes a theory of rm size distributions based on the underlying distribution of managerial talent. Likewise, Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier & Pàges (2011) study the impact of access to nance measured at the local level on rms' employment growth. They nd a positive eect of increased access to nance on employment growth for medium and large rms but no eect for micro and small rms. The authors propose that smaller rms may not necessarily be more credit constrained than larger rms.
Owners of smaller rms may instead have lower talent or capabilities on average, which keeps them from growing their rms. 1 We focus on the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The link between nance and employment is particularly interesting to study for these countries because they have experienced substantial market distortions with the transition from centrally planned to market economies. These distortions have had dramatic consequences for the labour market, and the need for more jobs is still evident. Financial systems had to be built from scratch, and the countries have done so at dierent speed. The level of nancial development ranges today from not having changed much from a rigid centrally planned economy to being close to the standards of an industrialised market economy (EBRD 2012) . On average, countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States have less developed nancial systems than countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe.
The data reveal considerable variation in the eect of nancial development on employment across rm types. Specically, we nd that micro and small rms are negatively aected by a higher level of nancial development, but this is not the case for medium and large rms. These ndings emerge with the complete sample and with the subgroup of Southeastern European countries. According to Lucas (1978) , rm size is a good proxy for an individual rm's managerial capital. Therefore, our results conrm the theoretical conjecture. The ndings are in line with recent experimental evidence that revealed a lower number of employees among microenterprises with access to credit compared to those without (Karlan & Zinman 2011) .
The paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we provide new evidence that nancial development at the country level aects rm-level results. There are several studies that have shown such eects (Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 1998 , Love 2003 , Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 2005 , Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven & Levine 2008 ) but none of them has analyzed the inuence of nancial development on rm-level employment decisions. Pagano & Pica (2011) do focus on the relationship between nancial development and employment but they study employment at the industry level, not the rm level. Second, our theoretical model provides the basis for questioning previous empirical ndings, which suggest that small rms tend to gain more -in terms of growth in sales and value added -from nancial development than large rms (Beck et al. 2005; Beck et al. 2008) . In line with Aterido et al. (2011) , we show that large rms may instead be the ones that gain most from nancial development. Third, to the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study in this eld of the literature that concentrates on transition countries.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briey describes the relevant literature. In Section 3 we develop the model. Section 4 sets out the econometric methodology, Section 5 explains the data and Section 6 reports the results. Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusion.
Related literature
The nancial turmoil in recent years and the subsequent deep cuts in employment in many rms have brought the issue of nance and employment to the forefront of the political as well as the academic agenda. This has initiated a bunch of new research in the eld while earlier contributions dealt only occasionally with the link between nance and employment (e.g. Sharpe 1994 , Benito & Hernando 2003 , Brown, Earle & Lup 2005 , Musso & Schiavo 2007 .
Several studies investigate the link between nancial constraints (typically measured at the rm level) and employment decisions. Blalock, Gertler & Levine (2008) focus on the eect of nancial constraints on rms' employment during times of large currency devaluations and banking sector failures. Specically, the authors investigate how rm-level employment in Indonesia was aected by the Asian nancial crisis. They use domestic ownership of exporters as an indicator for nancial constraints and a limited ability to gain from better terms of trade. Their results show that domestically-owned exporters with presumably no access to foreign capital have more than 20 percent lower employment than foreign-owned exporters. Campello, Graham & Harvey (2009) reveal that US, European and Asian rms, which are constrained because of the nancial turmoil in 2008, plan higher job cuts than non-constrained rms. Caggese & Cunat (2008) show theoretically and empirically for Italy that nancially constrained rms are more prone to use highly exible employment contracts than non-constrained rms. The intensive usage of exible employment helps companies to regain their capability to absorb demand volatility on the product side. This result implies that a lack of nancial exibility forces rms to use exible labor contracts instead, provided that labor market regulation provides for sucient exibility.
Benmelech, Bergman & Seru (2011) take a dierent path and relate their work to the nance and growth literature. They argue that there is an employment-to-cash ow sensitivity, similar to the investment-to-cash ow sensitivity (see e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen 1988) . Based on the results of three quasi-experiments, the authors claim that the availability of credit has a direct eect on rm employment, and subsequently, on economy-wide employment rates. Pagano & Pica (2011) take this research a step further. They provide a theory of incomplete contracts to explain the impact of a country's nancial development on employment. In their framework, a more developed nancial system better restricts opportunistic behavior of borrowers.
Increased repayment discipline enables banks to expand nancial access. Their focus is on the heterogeneity of the eect of nancial development on employment across industries. Those industries, which have the strongest need for external nance, benet the most from the development of the nancial system. Therefore, employment gain is the highest in these industries. However, the eect of an improvement is high only as long as nancial development is low. It tapers o if the system is already highly developed. Pagano & Pica (2011) rely on international industry-level data for 1970 till 2003 to conrm this conjecture. Aterido et al. (2011) explore the impact of a rm's business environment, including its nancial environment, on employment growth. They depart from the nance and growth literature in three important ways. First, they measure the nancial environment at the local level, rather than at the country level. Second, they focus on the question of whether rms of dierent sizes are dierently aected by their nancial environment. And third, they exploit data from a large number of countries, most of them developing countries. Large rms are found to have better access to nance than micro and small enterprises. The authors reveal strong non-linear eects: employment growth increases with better access to nance only in the case of large and medium-sized rms.
Our research is closely related to both Pagano & Pica (2011) and Aterido et al. (2011) . By adjusting the model of Pagano & Pica (2011) to the rm level and introducing managerial capital into this model, we are able to conrm the non-linear employment eect of nancial development shown in Aterido et al. (2011) theoretically and, to the extent that rm size is a good proxy for managerial capital, also empirically.
Theoretical Background
We borrow the theoretical background from Pagano & Pica (2011) . However, they concentrate on the impact of better access to nance on industry-specic employment, while we focus on employment in individual rms. We therefore adjust the framework of Pagano & Pica (2011) to individual rms and introduce rm-specic managerial capital as proposed by Bruhn et al. (2010) . Specically, we assume that there exists a continuum of rm types in the economy with managerial capital
Managerial capital of rms and employment
The production function of a rm i is
Production depends positively on the managerial capital γ i , the productivity parameter θ, the invested capital K and employment L. For simplicity we set the productivity parameter equal to one.
Initially, rm owners have own assets of value A. Imagine that A is a rm in which the owner is self-employed. Firm expansion requires investing A and borrowing from a bank. The investment A is sunk if expansion occurs. The interest rate is normalized to zero for simplicity of analysis. 2 The bank knows the rm's prot P i (.) (net value of the rm) but can enforce repayment only to the extent that the nancial system's degree of sophistication λ allows. λ < 1 denes the proportion of the net value of the rm which the bank can seize for compensation of the original loan. Hence, λ determines repayment and, therefore, original loan size.
The following sequence of events is assumed given that the owner wants to expand. The rm owner receives in the rst stage a take-it-or-leave-it oer from the bank about how much the rm can borrow. Given the value of own assets A the owner then decides about the investment K. Note that A is part of investment K. In the second stage the rm owner chooses the employment level L given that investment K is already xed in stage 1. With the extractable prot share 1 − λ and S(.) as the owner's prot share the maximization problem is
subject to the owner's participation constraint (1 − λ) P i (L) ≥ A whereL is the surplus-maximizing amount of labour. The rm owner raises external money if, and only if, her share of the net rm value is equal or exceeds own assets A. The resulting surplus-maximizing level of employment iŝ
The bank grants a loan of size F with F ≤ λ P (L). Own assets A and bank loan F determine the total amount available for investment
Solving the equality for K yields an optimal total investment of
In this case, the owner will have enough liquidity to meet the desired investment level. No nancial constraints exist. If expression (2) does not hold the owner is nancially constrained in the sense that the sum of own debt capacity plus own assets A allows only an investment level that is below the desired level. Solving expression (2) as equality yields the lower threshold
Firm i is constrained for all wage levels w > w. The threshold w grows in the rm's managerial
The owner's participation constraint requires
Equality of rm income and own assets denes an upper wage threshold
If the wage level is above thresholdw rm i is unwilling to raise external funds. Note thatw is independent of the degree of nancial development but grows in the managerial capital γ i :
In contrast, the lower threshold w increases with λ: Figure 1 shows the prohibiting wage thresholdw(γ i ) and the lower threshold w(γ i , λ).
In the interval w(γ i , λ) < w <w(γ i ) rms are nancially constrained and the optimal labour demand of a rm with managerial capital γ i is
The labour demand is decreasing in the wage level. Note that w(γ i , λ) = 0 for λ = 0. In this case each rm independent of its managerial capital γ i is restricted to own assets A. Demand for labour increases with managerial capital for any given wage level and any given state of nancial Assume for a moment that only one rm is active in the market. An equilibrium in the labour market exists if the labour supply curve, L S (w), is increasing in the wage level, δ L S /δ w > 0. In
Since higher managerial capital induces higher labour demand the equilibrium wage level w * (γ i , λ) increases in γ i (see Figure   1 ). It converges for high levels of γ i against w(γ i , λ).
In the realistic case of multiple rms with dierent managerial capital an increase in the wage level w * prevents some rms with lower managerial capital from borrowing. Figure 1 illustrates this. Let us assume for simplicity that the equilibrium wage level is determined by the rm with the highest managerial capital in the market. An increase of the highest managerial capital from γ 1 to γ 2 shifts the wage level w * (.) by ∆ w upwards in Figure 1 . This shift overcompensates the initial advantage from the better access to nance for rms with managerial capital in the range of ∆ γ . They can no longer compete on the labour market as the new wage level w * (γ 1 ) + ∆ w is above their prohibiting thresholdw(γ i ).
3 See Appendix 7. 4 See Appendix 7. 8
The eect of nancial development
When the degree of nancial development increases, e.g. from λ low to λ high in Figure 2 , the threshold w shifts upwards for any level of managerial capital. The debt capacity of any rm is larger than before. Consequently, any rm with managerial capital γ i > γ 1 in Figure 2 would expand its labour demand if no change in the wage level occurred. However, the additional labour demand increases the equilibrium wage level and drives rms with lower levels of managerial capital out of the lending market. Figure 2 illustrates that. An increase in nancial development by ∆ λ shifts the equilibrium wage level for a given managerial capital γ 3 upwards from w * 1 to w * 2 . For rms with managerial capital ∆γ = γ 2 − γ 1 this increase in wages, ∆w * = w * 2 − w * 1 , overcompensates the initial advantage from the higher degree of nancial development. The rm owner would not be able anymore to pay these wages and to meet the own participation constraint. The higher γ 3 is the more rms in the lower range of managerial capital are unable to meet the own participation constraint and reduce thus employment in response to the higher degree of nancial development.
In contrast, all rms with γ i > γ 2 can aord the new wage level and their labour demand and employment grows in response to the higher degree of nancial development. The growth is higher the larger γ i is. To see this, consider the derivative 5
The positive sign implies that a rm's marginal demand for labour with respect to λ responds positively to an increase in managerial capital. That is, rms with lower managerial capital experience lower employment growth when the degree of nancial development becomes higher than rms with higher managerial capital.
So far, we have assumed that the rm with the highest managerial capital determines the wage level in the market. Now, we drop this simplifying assumption and explore whether the previous results hold in the equilibrium determined by the aggregate labour demand of all market rms. The aggregate demand is dened as
For any given maximum managerial capital γ z the inequality
denes the equilibrium market wage w * * . Inequality (5) ensures that w * * (λ) > w * (γ i , λ). Therefore, an increase in the degree of nancial development, ∆ λ, initiates additional labour demand by rms with larger managerial capital, γ i > γ −1 i (w = w * * ). However, labour demand decreases in response to higher nancial developments for rms with fairly low managerial capital, γ i < γ −1 i (w = w * * ). Based on this theoretical result, we propose the following hypothesis to be tested empirically:
Hypothesis
Financial development aects the employment of rms with dierent managerial capital in a nonlinear way. Firms with lower managerial capital experience lower employment growth when the degree of nancial development becomes higher than rms with higher managerial capital.
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On the basis of our theoretical prediction, we use the following regression model to estimate rms' employment growth:
where i represents the individual rm, j the country in which rm i is located, and t the current time period. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the gross growth rate of a rm's employment over time. This is regressed on the rm's initial size type ijt−1 , which is a proxy for the rm's managerial capital, and an interaction of this variable with the initial level of nancial development in a country f indev jt−1 . Firm-specic controls X ijt are included. ε is the idiosyncratic error term assumed to possess the usual desirable characteristics. The key coecient of interest is δ, which determines the impact of nancial development on employment for rms with distinct managerial capital. We estimate equation (6) with an OLS model.
Following Aterido et al. (2011) , we include initial rm size instead of current rm size in order to correctly measure the relationship between employment growth and the level of nancial development. Assume that the eect of nancial development on employment growth diers for small and large rms such that both rm types benet from a higher level of nancial development but large rms more so than small rms. At any level of nancial development, there will be some small rms that grow and become large rms and some small rms that do not grow (depending on their respective managerial capital). If we counted the growing, initially small rms as large rms, we would underestimate the eect of nancial development on employment growth for large rms. We consider the level of nancial development that rms faced at t − 1 to be relevant for the growth that they achieve between t − 1 and t.
Pagano & Pica (2011) nd that nancial development aects employment growth of industries in non-OECD countries, while industries in OECD countries remain unaected. This is explained by the fact that OECD countries have on average highly developed nancial systems where further improvements in nancial development are hardly possible. This is not the case in non-OECD countries. Given the sub-regional dierences in our sample, we test how individual rms respond to changes in nancial development across the entire set of transition countries but also across countries of their particular sub-region.
Data
The implementation of the econometric model requires rm-level data on employment and other rm characteristics and data on countries' nancial development. in 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, and 2012) .
The strengths of the survey are the use of a consistent survey instrument across a large number of countries, which facilitates cross-country analyses, and the inclusion of a large set of retrospective questions. We use data from the 2005 wave, which contains about 10,800 observations. 6 The sample rms have existed for at least four years and had more than one and less than 10,000 full-time employees at the time of the survey. We restrict the sample to the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. We lose a number of observations due to missing values for the variables included in our estimations. The nal sample consists of 8,561 observations. The number of rms per country varies widely. Table 1 provides a description of the sample composition. The sample was drawn in form of quota sampling on the basis of rm registries or similar lists. 7 In the below regressions, we adjust the standard 6 The 2009 wave contains less detailed information on physical investment then the 2005 wave, and we therefore use the data from 2009 only for a robustness check. Note that the 2012 wave is not yet available. 7 This means that the number of rms representing the manufacturing and service sectors in the sample were errors for clustering at the country level.
Our main interest is the evolution of employment at the rm level and its dependence on nancial development and rms' managerial capital. The 2005 BEEPS contains information about the number of full-time employees at the time of the survey t as well as 36 months ago at t − 1. We use these employment numbers to create our dependent variable (ln( emp ijt emp ijt−1 )). The managerial capital of rms is proxied by dummy variables representing the rm size in t − 1. We distinguish between micro (2-10 full-time employees), small (11-49 full-time employees), medium (50-249 full-time employees) and large (250-9,999 full-time employees) rms. Note that the share of rms that have a loan at the time of the survey is considerably lower among initially micro and small rms than among initially medium and large rms ( Table 2) .
We use two alternative indicators for the level of nancial development: (1) private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as a share of GDP (privcred ) and (2) the asset share of foreign owned banks (forshare). These are derived from the Financial Development and Structure Dataset of the World Bank and the EBRD Banking Survey, respectively. We argue that these indicators are adequate measures of nancial development, especially with regard to transition countries where the banking sector had to be transformed from one in which credit allocation was directed by the state to one which follows market considerations. Transformation essentially meant to liberalise interest rates, transfer commercial banking activities from the central bank to state banks, restructure and privatise state banks, allow entry of new private banks, including foreign banks, set up an appropriate legal framework, and initiate prudential regulation and supervision (Fries & Taci 2005) . Measures of private credit and assets of foreign banks in an economy are therefore proxies of the extent that such transformation has taken place. 8 Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the evolution of these indicators of nancial development in the determined so as to reect these sectors' contribution to GDP. Among the manufacturing and service rms in each country, a number of quota on the size of the rms, their ownership structure, their export orientation and their geographical location were to be fullled. For example, at least 10 percent of the sample had to be rms with 2-49 employees and at least 10 percent with 250-9999 employees. In this way, a self-weighted sample was constructed. More details on sampling can be found at http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/beeps.shtml. 8 The asset share of foreign banks as an indicator for nancial development may be controversial. However, it has been argued in the context of transition countries that foreign-owned banks use sophisticated credit technology, which tends to be adopted by domestic banks. As a consequence, foreign-owned banks are claimed to have positively inuenced the eciency and stability of the banking sector in transition countries (Bonin, Hasan & Wachtel 2005 , Fries & Taci 2005 , EBRD 2006 . period between 1998 and 2010, which is the period for which we have consistent data for both indicators. These gures are based on simple averages (unweighted for population size) calculated for all countries in our sample as well as the three sub-regions Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Southeastern Europe (SEE), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 9 Private credit as a share of GDP (privcred ) steadily increased in the transition region and in all three sub-regions separately until 2009, when the global crisis appears to have hit the region (Figure 3) . However, the sub-regions dier strongly in the level of nancial development. In the CEE countries, privcred stood at around 30 percent in 1998 and achieved the level of 80 percent in 2009. In the SEE countries, it increased from 17 percent to 48 percent over the same time period, and in the CIS countries, from 6 percent to 39 percent. Interestingly, the movement in the SEE countries mirrors the evolution of privcred in the complete sample.
The asset share of foreign-owned banks (forshare) behaves less stable (Figure 4 ). There is a steady upward movement between 1999 and 2008 in the SEE countries. Starting from a low level (31 percent in 1998), this sub-region reached an average share of more than 85 percent in the second half of the following decade. It is fair to say that banking in SEE countries developed gradually into a foreign-dominated sector. In the CIS countries, f orshare moved between slightly more than 20 percent to slightly more than 40 percent between 1998 and 2010. CEE countries show a more erratic movement, though at a higher level. After a period of stable growth, the foreign banks' asset share tends to decrease rather than increase since 2003. This may be an indication that the distribution of forshare is hump shaped. Starting at a low level of nancial development, the asset share of foreign banks inceases up to a certain point after which it decreases again -because domestic banks have now become suciently sophisticated. If so, forshare may not be a good indicator of nancial development in countries where the transformation of the banking sector has been concluded. We take this into consideration by also running our regressions separately for the dierent sub-regions In our regressions, we measure nancial development at t − 1, which refers to the year 2002.
Specically, we calculate the means of privcred and forshare over the years 2001-2003 to even out extreme values. The control variables X ijt include the following variables: invest controls for trends in physical investment over the last 3 years, gov for government inuence, f oreign for access to foreign money, and export for geographical diversication. city is a control that proxies the local business environment, including the proximity of customers. Some recent contributions argue that a rm's employment growth depends more on age, rather than size (Haltiwanger, Jarmin & Miranda 2010 , Earle & Telegdy 2011 , and Lawless 2013 . We therefore control for a rm's age (age) in our below estimations. The variable age2 is included to account for a possible nonlinear eect of rm age. 10 Table 3 provides a detailed description of all variables as well as the respective data sources. Table 4 , nearly 75 percent of the sample were micro or small rms three years before the survey took place, and the share of large rms is just above 10 percent. Table 5 illustrates that 27 percent of all rms decreased their full-time employment between 2002 and 2005; 43 percent increased their employment; and 30 percent did not have any changes in employment. Table 6 shows that all rms grew on average 28 percent in this time period; yet, average employment growth is the higher, the smaller the rm is. 6 Results 6.1 All countries Table 7 reports the outcome of estimating Equation (6). Columns (1) and (2) (1) and (3). The measures interacted with type have a signicantly negative coecient for micro rms in Columns (2) and (4) and additionally for small rms in Column (2). This implies that micro (and possibly also small) rms in countries with a higher level of nancial development experience lower employment growth 10 These controls are similar to those included by others in the literature (see, e.g. Aterido et al. 2011 , Beck et al. 2005 , Brown et al. 2005 . than micro (and small) rms in countries with a lower level of nancial development. The coecient of the interaction term with large rms is positive and marginally signicant for both measures of nancial development. Large rms in countries with a higher level of nancial development seem to have higher employment growth than large rms in countries with a lower level of nancial development.
As shown in
These results are in line with our hypothesis that small rm with low managerial capital are not able to compete anymore when nancial development pushes wages up. In contrast, the ndings of Beck et al. (2005) and Beck et al. (2008) propose particular benets (in terms of sales and value added) for small and opaque rms from a more developed nancial system. Our evidence runs contrary to this literature to the extent that growth in sales and value added coincides with additional employment. Such a positive link can be expected in the emerging economies of transition countries.
The coecients of the control variables meet our expectations. Physical investment (invest) and access to foreign markets (export) display highly signicant and positive coecients in all specications. The coecients for government and foreign ownership (gov and f oreign) as well as for being located amidst a large potential costumer basis (city) are estimated to be signicantly positive. The impact of age is estimated to be signicantly negative and slightly convex. This indicates that employment growth is lower in older rms than in younger rms but the eect tapers o for higher ages.
The positive correlation of invest and employment growth is in line with the theory. It suggests that there is no substitution of physical investment for employment on average. Instead, employment tends to increase when there is growth in physical investment. To investigate potential heterogeneity, we divide the sample into rms with positive investment growth and rms with no or negative investment growth (measured over the same period as employment growth). We nd that the observed pattern of smaller rms being negatively aected and larger rms being positively aected by a higher level of nancial development holds for both sub-samples. 11 11 The results are not reported her but are available from the authors on request.
Regional sub-samples
Exploration of the regional sub-groups may enable us to get a more detailed picture about the link between nancial development and rms' employment growth. Table 8 displays the outcomes of applying Equation (6) to CEE, SEE and CIS countries separately.
The ndings conrm our predictions for the two sub-regions with the more developed nancial systems. First, nancial development measured by privcred aects smaller rms in the SEE countries negatively and large rms positively (Column (2)). Second, privcred does not aect employment growth in the CEE countries (Column (1)), which are those with the highest level of nancial development. The insignicance of the interaction terms is compatible with the hypothesis of a decreasing impact of changes in nancial development when the countries have already achieved highly developed nancial systems (Pagano & Pica 2011) .
However, the data suggest that the model also does not apply to the CIS countries (Column (3)), i.e. the sub-region with the lowest level of nancial development, even though it is unclear theoretically why this would be the case. The level of nancial development is far below those levels for which one would expect no further impact. The insignicance of privcred interacted with tpye may be caused by an existing lower threshold below which changes in the level of nancial development fail to have an impact. For example, if micronance institutions play a substantial role for rms' investment and employment in countries with a very poor nancial development, variations in an indicator measuring the development in the traditional nancial system may be irrelevant for smaller rms. Among the CIS countries, only Armenia, Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic have a strong micronance sector with ten or more microcredit borrowers per 1,000 population. It is unlikely that these three countries drive the results. Ample labour supply in the CIS countries could be another reason for not nding any negative impact of nancial development on employment growth of micro rms. Over-supply of workers may neutralize the upward pressure on wages caused by better nancial access.
The results of the second indicator, forshare, deviate more from expectations than privcred. In particular, we nd that the interaction terms for micro, small and large rms in CIS countries are positive and marginally signicant. This nding signals the qualitative dierence between privcred and forshare as measures of nancial development. While a higher share of private credit in the economy does not aect rms' employment growth in this region, a larger involvement of foreign banks helps rms to grow their labour force.
Sensitivity analysis
In the following, we conduct a number of sensitivity checks to investigate whether our results are robust to dierent specications. First, nancial development tends to increase with economic development. 12 Therefore, our measures of nancial development may capture something dierent than simply the evolution of the nancial system. To test this conjecture, we add more controls in equation (6). Specically, we control for GDP, GDP growth, ination, and employment protection legislation. 13 Including all these variables together (Column (1) Second, we exclude outliers in the dependent variable lnemp (Column (2)). We dene outliers as those values that deviate by more than three standard deviations from the mean, by which we lose 200 observations. None of the interaction terms remain signicant when interacted with forshare.
The results for the interaction with privcred show a negative impact for medium-sized rms in addition to micro and small rms. As far as the sub-regions are concerned, we nd again robustness in the results for SEE countries.
Third, we exclude all rms from sectors other than manufacturing (Column (3)) because dierent sectors may have dierent employment patterns. In particular, substitution of physical investment for employment is particularly likely in manufacturing, compared with services. We nd our basic results conrmed, namely that smaller rms in countries with higher levels of nancial development experience lower employment growth than smaller rms in countries with lower levels of nancial development. For the privcred indicator, smaller rms comprise micro, small and even medium manufacturing rms; for the forshare indicator, they comprise only micro manufacturing rms. It should be noted that the coecient for invest is always positive and highly signicant (unreported), indicating that there is no substitutional eect between physical investment and labour.
Fourth, we now investigate whether the association between nancial development and employment growth diers by a rm's loan status. Possibly, employment growth of smaller rms is negatively aected in some countries because these rms are unable to obtain loans. We divide our sample into two sub-samples, rms without an outstanding loan at the time of the survey (Column (4)) and rms with an outstanding loan (Column (5)). We nd our basic results conrmed in both sub-samples. Micro and small rms in countries with a higher level of private credit as a share of GDP have lower employment growth than small rms in countries with a lower level, regardless of their own loan status. We argue that this nding is in line with our theoretical model: There is some macroeconomic development, such as higher wages, related with higher levels of nancial development that aects all rms -no matter whether or not these have access to credit. Information on physical investment is limited to an indicator of whether or not a rm purchased any xed assets in the previous year. We calculate privcred and forshare analogously to above. The regression results are reported in Table 11 . We nd that micro rms in all transition countries are negatively aected by a higher share of private credit in GDP, and other rm types are unaected (Column (1)). In contrast, a higher asset share of foreign banks aects micro and large rms negatively (Column (5)). Yet, these aggregated results of running the regression for all transition countries together hides important regional dierences. While nancial development is essentially unrelated with employment growth in CEE and CIS countries (Columns (2) and (6), and Columns (4) and (8), respectively), we observe the same pattern for SEE countries as above (Columns (3) and (7)). Micro rms have lower and large rms have higher employment growth with higher levels of nancial development.
Conclusion
This paper studies the association between a country's level of nancial development and rms' employment growth in transition countries. This is the rst paper, to our knowledge, attempting to clarify theoretically and empirically whether nancial development at the country level aects employment of individual rms in a non-monotonic way. We start with a theoretical model that captures the link between a rm's managerial capital and a country's nancial development. The model proposes that nancial development aects the employment of rms with insucient managerial capital negatively. We use rm size as a proxy for managerial capital in the empirical analysis.
We acknowledge that the model's proposition may not apply to ripe economies with highly sophisticated nancial systems as the impact of nancial development is likely to taper o at high levels.
Our ndings also do not provide direct evidence on the nance-growth nexus because we do not study growth at the country level and we do not focus on sales or prots. However, our results shed indirectly new light on this nexus to the extent that rm employment and growth in sales and prots are tightly connected.
We nd that nancial development has a signicant eect on employment growth of micro rms and large rms. An increase in the share of private credit signicantly reduces the employment growth of the smallest rms in our sample but increases the employment growth of large rms.
This evidence is in line with our theoretical propositions. It also coincides with recent experimental evidence, which has revealed a lower number of employees among microenterprises with access to credit compared to those without (Karlan & Zinman 2011) . In our sample, the described impact is particularly signicant in Southeastern Europe. In addition, nancial development measured by the asset share of foreign banks has a similar eect but this is less robust.
These results conrm the importance of nancial development for the country's economic development but the ndings also emphasize that the eect can be negative. A possibly negative eect of nancial development on employment growth has not been previously documented for transition countries. It has important implications for research and public policy. If nancial development is detrimental for the employment growth of smaller rms, this raises questions about the strategy of many governments in transition countries to support economic development by allocating considerable public ressources to bringing the country's nancial system forward. The key insight from this paper is therefore that any empirical study on the nance and (rm-)growth nexus should consider dierent rm types. If access to nance heats up competition on the labour market and pushes wages upwards, smaller and opaque rms may be at risk of loosing this battle. Financial development has distributional consequences which governments of transition countries need to be aware of.
This expression is positive since δφ The gure is based on the following parameter values α = 0.5, A = 5, λ low = 0.3, λ high = 0.6. w(λ low ),w(λ high ) andw(γ i ) correspond to expression (3) and (4) for α = 0.5, λ = 0.3 and λ = 0.6. The surplus maximizing labour demand for a rm with managerial capital γ i is L D (w, γ i , λ) = 5 γ i 2 ]/[4 1 − (3 γ i 2 )/(40 w) w 2 with 1−(3 γ i 2 )/(40 w) > 0. Labour supply is assumed as L S (w) = 8 w − 11.2. w * (γ i , λ) is calculated by solving L D (w, γ i , λ) = L S (w) for both values of λ. (1) and (2)) and forshare = asset share of foreign owned banks (columns (3) and (4) (1), (2) and (3)) and forshare = asset share of foreign owned banks (columns (4), (5) and (6)). The respective rst set of these columns uses data from Central and Eastern Europe (columns (1) and (4)), the second set for Southeastern Europe (columns (2) and (5)) and the third set for the Commonwealth of Independent States (columns (3) and (6)). privcred is not identied for Uzbekistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
Variable
(1) A constant, sector dummies and the same control variables as above are included but not reported. The columns report dierent sensitivity tests: We control for GDP, GDP growth, ination, and employment protection legislation in column (1). We exclude observations with outliers in the dependent variable in column (2) and use only manufacturing rms in column (3). We run the regression for rms without an outstanding loan in column (4) and with an outstanding loan in column (5). privcred is not identied for Uzbekistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) microXpriv -0.004*** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.004 -0.005*** (-4.452) (-2.715) (-3.682) (-1.711) (-4.214) smallXpriv -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.005*** (-5.630) (-3.798) (-3.658) (-2.269) (-4.790) medXpriv -0.000 -0.002* -0.004*** 0.000 -0.004** (-0.255) (- A constant, sector dummies and the same control variables as above are included but not reported. The columns report dierent sensitivity tests: We control for GDP, GDP growth, ination, and employment protection legislation in column (1). We exclude observations with outliers in the dependent variable in column (2) and use only manufacturing rms in column (3). We run the regression for rms without an outstanding loan in column (4) and with an outstanding loan in column (5).***, ** and * indicate signicance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) microXfor -0.001** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 (-2.501) (-1.228) (-2.126) (-0.813) (-1.528) smallXfor -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 (-2.300) (-0.386) (-0.433) (-0.635) (-0.972) medXfor -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 (-0.132) (-0.319) (-1.485) (0.155) (-0.666) largeXfor 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 (1.220) (-0.202 A constant, sector dummies and the same control variables as above are included but not reported. The columns report results for dierent indicators of nancial development: privcred = private credit by deposit money banks and other nancial institutions as a share of GDP (columns (1)-(4)) and forshare = asset share of foreign owned banks (columns (5)- (8)). In columns (1) and (5), all transition countries are included, in columns (2) and (6), only CEE countries, in columns (3) and (7), only SEE countries, and in columns (4) and (8), only CIS countries. privcred is not identied for Uzbekistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina; and forshare for Kosovo.***, ** and * indicate signicance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) microXpriv -0.005*** 0.002 -0.008*** -0.002 (-3.282) (0.766) (-3.847) (-0.333) smallXpriv -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 (- 
